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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Appeal rises from a final Judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Leslie A. Lewis presiding. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-
2a-3(2)(K). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides at 
subparagraph (b) that the brief of the Appellee not include a 
statement of issues, unless "the appellee is dissatisfied with the 
statement of the appellant". Appellee is not dissatisfied with the 
issues as stated. However, Appellee is dissatisfied the statement 
of the Appellant regarding the standard of review. As will be 
discussed below, the standard of review which should be applied in 
this case is a "clear abuse of discretion" or "clearly erroneous" 
standard. The authorities for this position are set out in the 
argument portion of this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
In this case the Plaintiff, Brent A. Ferrin, was employed by 
the Defendant, Keith B. Romney between 1986 and 1990. Mr. Romney 
owned and operated a condominium consulting firm in Salt Lake 
City. The agreement between these parties was that Mr. Ferrin 
would receive 25% of all income earned by Mr. Romney during the 
time of employment of Mr. Ferrin. The agreement between the 
parties was that Mr. Ferrin would be entitled to receive this 25% 
when it was received by Mr. Romney. 
The parties recognized that often the income, in the form of 
consulting fees, was earned by Mr. Ferrin and Mr. Romney but was 
not paid until some time later. Mr. Ferrin brought an action to 
recover his 25% share of income which had been earned by Mr. Ferrin 
and Mr. Romney, prior to the termination of employment, but which 
income was actually received after Mr. Ferrin left Mr. Romney's 
employ. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW. 
This case was tried to a jury, commencing on January 25, 1993, 
and continuing through January 28, 1993. The matter was submitted 
to the jury in the form of a Special Verdict, which was returned 
in favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant. A Judgment on 
Jury Verdict was granted in favor of Plaintiff and against 
Defendant, granting to Plaintiff a judgment of $102,681.42, 
together with a 20% share of all other monies received by the 
Defendant after that date on certain projects upon which income had 
been earned but not received. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The verdict of the jury was entered after the presentation of 
three full days of evidence. The verdict of the jury is well 
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within, and supported by, the evidence presented. The verdict of 
the jury should be allowed to stand. 
The rulings of the trial court on both the admissibility of 
the evidence and on the taxing of costs are matters within the 
discretion of the trial court. They are to be overturned on appeal 
only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion and only when 
the decisions of the trial court are clearly erroneous. 
Regarding the issue of the admissibility of Defendant's 
proposed Exhibits 57 and 58, the trial court was well within its 
discretion to rule that both Exhibits were irrelevant. This was 
a case involving the compensation arrangement between the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant and nothing more. The Defendant and the 
Plaintiff, on an ongoing basis, had been discussing the possibility 
of the Plaintifffs purchase of the Defendant's business. Both 
Exhibits 57 and 58 relate exclusively to the attempts of the 
Plaintiff and Defendant to negotiate a buy-out arrangement. 
Neither one of these documents relates to the negotiations between 
the parties as to the compensation arrangement of the Plaintiff as 
an employee of the Defendant. The compensation of the Plaintiff 
was a matter which had already been negotiated and set. 
Accordingly, the trial court was clearly within its authority to 
rule that negotiations, and documents reflecting those 
negotiations, regarding the attempts of the parties to buy or sell 
the business were irrelevant. 
On the issue of the taxing of costs, the Appellate Courts of 
Utah have consistently ruled that the taxing of costs is a matter 
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within the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, only 
actual travel costs of out-of-state witnesses were taxed. 
Plaintiff was clearly the prevailing party. Plaintiff should, 
therefore, be entitled to recover those costs. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT 
IN EXCLUDING EXHIBITS 57 AND 58. 
A. THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
As noted at the outset of this Brief, an issue is raised by 
the Defendant as to the applicable standard of review which this 
Court should apply in reviewing the exclusion of certain evidence. 
It is the position of the Plaintiff that the law in Utah is not 
subject to debate on this issue. Rulings as to the admissibility 
or exclusion of evidence are uniquely left to the sound discretion 
of the trial court and are not to be overturned, unless there is 
a clear abuse of that discretion showing the ruling of the trial 
court to be clearly erroneous. 
Although the issue of the standard of review has been the 
subject of much scrutiny by the Appellate Courts, the position of 
the Courts has not changed. In the case of Bambrouah v. Bethers, 
552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976), the Utah Supreme Court stated the rule 
which is presently applicable: 
The judgment of the trial court will not be reversed 
unless it is shown that the discretion exercised therein 
has been abused. The trial court is given considerable 
discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted 
is relevant. Even if the evidence was erroneously 
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admitted, that fact alone is insufficient to set aside 
a verdict, unless it has "had a substantial influence in 
bringing about the verdict". Id. at 1290. 
The ruling in Bambrough was supported by the subsequent 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Terry v. Zions £o-0p. 
Mercantile Institution. 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). There, the 
Court, in affirming the trial court's exclusion of certain evidence 
on relevancy grounds, held: 
It is generally conceded the trial court is more 
competent, in the exercise of this discretion, to judge 
the exigencies of a particular case, and, therefore, when 
exercised within normal limits, the discretion should not 
be disturbed. The general rule followed by this court 
is the judgment of the trial court will not be reversed 
unless it is shown that the discretion exercised therein 
has been abused. Id. at 322-23. 
The later decision in McFarland v. Skaggs, 678 P. 2d 298 (Utah 
1984) , reversed Terry on the issue of false imprisonment but did 
not reverse Terry on the issue of the admissibility of evidence. 
The more recent decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have 
applied, with consistency, the abuse of discretion standard. Thus, 
in Nav v. General Motors Corp., 850 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1993), the 
Court, in affirming the trial court's exclusion of irrelevant 
evidence, stated: 
We begin our discussion of the recall and redesign 
evidence by stating the appropriate standard of review. 
We review a trial court's determination that evidence 
should be excluded . . . for abuse of discretion and 
reverse only if the ruling is beyond the bounds of 
reasonability. Xd. at 1262. 
Likewise, in State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), the Utah 
Supreme Court, in its Footnote No. 11 at page 1270, held that a 
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"correctness" standard is not to be applied as to the trial court 
rulings on admissibility of evidence and other factual findings. 
Accordingly, the standard of review here to be applied is one 
which grants to the trial court broad discretion as to its rulings 
on relevancy, which rulings are not to be overturned unless there 
is a showing of clear abuse. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN EXCLUDING EXHIBITS 57 AND 58. 
With respect to the ruling of the trial court on the 
admissibility of Exhibits 57 and 58, Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, provides: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
party is affected . . . . 
While Rule 401 of the Utah Rules of Evidence gives a broad 
definition of the term "relevance", the issue of what is relevant 
at trial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. The 
reason for this principle is that there is no exact definition of 
the term relevance. Accordingly, discretion must be granted to the 
trial court to make determinations as the evidence is presented. 
In the case at hand, the trial court allowed the Defendant to 
make a complete proffer as to Exhibits 57 and 58. (R. 1182.) The 
proffer made is not in dispute. The Defendant admitted that the 
two documents which he desired to admit were documents relating, 
not to the issue of the compensation arrangement between Plaintiff 
and Defendant, but, rather, to the attempts by the Plaintiff and 
Defendant to negotiate a sale of Defendant's 
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business. (R. 1183.) In other words, the documents did not deal 
with any issue before the trial court. The documents dealt with 
an issue which was completely separate and apart from the 
compensation issue at trial. 
At no time did the Defendant allege or proffer that during the 
negotiations for the sale of the business the issue of the 
compensation of the Plaintiff arose. The Defendant did not allege, 
nor proffer, that the issue of what the Defendant should pay the 
Plaintiff for his efforts was an issue in the negotiations as to 
what the Defendant might be willing to sell his business for. 
A decision as to the exclusion or admission of evidence is 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court because it is a 
matter of logic and experience, not a matter of law. See, e.g. , 
State v. Abu-Isba. 235 Kan. 851, 685 P.2d 856 (1984). In State v. 
Wagner, 248 Kan. 240, 807 P.2d 139 (1991), the Kansas Supreme 
Court, dealing with the definition of relevance which is identical 
to Rule 401, stated: 
For evidence of collateral facts to be competent, there 
must be some natural or logical connection between them 
and the inference or result they are designed to 
establish. Id. at 142. 
Likewise, in People v. Babbitt, 45 Cal.3d 660, 248 Cal.Rptr. 69, 
767 P.2d 253 (1988), the Supreme Court of California, again dealing 
with the statutory definition of relevance identical to our own, 
declared: 
The trial court is vested with wide discretion in 
determining the relevance of evidence. [Citation 
omitted.] The court, however, has no discretion to admit 
irrelevant evidence. [Citation omitted.] Speculative 
inferences that are derived from evidence cannot be 
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deemed to be relevant to establish the speculatively 
inferred fact . . .. Id. at 263. (Emphasis added.) 
The Trial Judge, Judge Lewis, accurately and adequately 
applied each of these principles in her ruling. The trial court 
correctly noted that the issue before the Court was the 
compensation agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, and what 
monies Plaintiff was entitled to receive as a result of his 
agreement with the Defendant. (R. 1187A.) The trial court 
correctly noted that Exhibits 57 and 58 had nothing whatsoever to 
do with the compensation arrangement between Plaintiff and 
Defendant. (R. 1188.) Those documents dealt solely and 
exclusively with the issue of Plaintiff purchasing Defendant's 
business. As Judge Lewis stated: 
We are not talking about this agreement. We are not 
talking about an anticipated agreement that may or may 
not have been entered by the parties. We are talking 
about a specific compensation agreement that is not 
covered in this document. (R. 1188.) 
Exhibits 57 and 58 were simply not helpful in proving any 
disputed fact. They were, in the classic sense of the word, 
irrelevant. The following facts, among others, support this 
conclusion: 
1. Both documents dealt with negotiations for the 
purchase of the business, not with the issue of compensation 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. 
2. Each of the documents were nothing more than a 
proposal, created as a part of a preliminary negotiation. No 
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agreement was ever entered into between Plaintiff and Defendant 
which even remotely resembled either Exhibit 57 or Exhibit 58. 
3. The pertinent language from Exhibit 57 which 
Defendant thinks is important, deals with the hypothetical 
situation of the Defendant remaining with the company after he had 
sold it to Plaintiff. The language cited by the Defendant stands 
for the proposition that, if the Defendant remained with the 
Plaintiff after purchase of the business, the Defendant would be 
entitled to compensation. Defendant apparently argues that, since 
such proposal was made, it obviously shows that the agreement 
between Plaintiff and Defendant on Plaintiff's compensation was the 
same. (R. 1183.) Such a presumption is illogical and not 
supported by any other evidence. 
4. Exhibit 58, was not even drafted by Plaintiff and 
does not constitute his words. It was made clear by counsel during 
the argument on this issue, that Exhibit 58 was a proposed draft 
prepared by an attorney for Plaintiff and that the language which 
the attorney placed in the document was not Plaintiff's language 
and was not approved by Plaintiff. Indeed, it was proffered that 
the Plaintiff would testify that the document was unacceptable, 
even to Plaintiff and was never used as a part of the negotiations. 
(R. 1187.) 
Accordingly, there is only the most tenuous of connections 
between Exhibits 57 and 58 and the issue before the trial court. 
The documents were nothing more than discussion drafts. There was 
not evidence ever adduced to show that either document represented 
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the mind, will or desires of either party. It is illogical to 
presume that when two parties negotiate on subject A, without 
regard to subject B, there negotiations are somehow probative of 
the issues on subject B. 
The parties were attempting to hammer out a buy/sell 
agreement. That buy/sell agreement did not include, in any way, 
the issue of the then-current compensation of the Plaintiff. The 
connection, therefore, between these documents and the issue of 
Plaintiff's compensation is non-existent. 
C. EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 WERE PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNDER RULE 403. 
Although not specifically mentioned by Judge Lewis, it is 
apparent that the ruling of the trial court excluding Exhibits 57 
and 58, is also supported by Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Rule 403 provides as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
The Plaintiff believes that the trial court was clearly 
correct in ruling that the negotiations regarding the buy-out 
agreement were totally irrelevant to the issues being tried. 
However, it is also apparent that the exclusion of the evidence by 
the Trial Judge can be supported by the above-quoted Rule. 
The trial court was faced with the task of focusing the jury 
on the issue of the amount of compensation to which the Plaintiff 
was entitled under his arrangement with the Defendant. The buy-
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out negotiations between the parties were a separate event which 
was totally unconnected to the issue of Plaintiff's compensation. 
Therefore, allowing Exhibits 57 and 58 would unduly mislead and 
tend to confuse the jury. It would allow the jury to focus on an 
issue which was not presented and which was not necessary for a 
determination as to the compensation of the Plaintiff. 
In addition, the admission of Exhibits 57 and 58 would have 
unduly delayed and complicated the trial. The trial court was 
aware that Exhibit 58, by the testimony of the Plaintiff, was a 
draft document put together by an attorney. The Plaintiff would 
have testified that the document was unacceptable to him and would 
not reflect the facts as he understood them. (R. 1187.) Admission 
of Exhibit 58 would have required the parties to call the attorney 
as a witness, thereby unduly delaying the trial and wasting the 
time of the Court and parties. Under Rule 403, such is an 
acceptable reason for denying the admissibility of evidence, 
especially in light of its highly questionable probative value. 
D. ADMISSION OF EXHIBITS 57 AND 58 WOULD NOT HAVE ALTERED THE 
OUTCOME. 
The Defendant is correct that to be reversible error, the 
exclusion of evidence must be shown to have a reasonable likelihood 
of affecting the outcome. See, State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 
1989) . The Plaintiff believes that the ruling of the trial court 
on relevancy is sufficient and correct. However, assuming, for 
purposes of argument, that the trial court was in error, the error 
11 
must be shown to have been prejudicial. The Defendant has failed 
to make such a showing. 
Even if Exhibits 57 and 58 had been admitted, they were of 
little probative value. Exhibit 57 talks about the compensation 
that Keith Romney would get if he stayed with Brent Ferrin after 
the purchase of the business. What Keith Romney would have 
received has nothing to do with what Brent Ferrin was receiving. 
Exhibit 58, as has been argued above, was nothing more than 
a preliminary draft which was not even approved for circulation or 
use by the Plaintiff. It did not represent his present view of 
anything and was an unacceptable document. It was part of a 
preliminary negotiation for buy-out which never came to fruition. 
At the same time, there was ample evidence that the Defendant 
had benefitted greatly from the efforts of the Plaintiff and that 
the income of the Defendant had substantially increased as a result 
of the Plaintiff's help. There was also an admission by the 
Defendant that Plaintiff would receive his share of the income 
which had been earned but not received. 
The admission is contained in Exhibit 10-P. In Exhibit 10-P, 
the Defendant states: 
Brent A. Ferrin has been my executive vice-president 
since July, 1986, and as such receives 2 5% of the net 
income that Keith Romney Associates (KRA) earns. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Later in the document, the Defendant admits that the Plaintiff will 
be entitled to his 25% share at some future date when money was 
received, stating as follows: 
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Therefore, Brent will be entitled to 25% ($75,000.00) at 
that time, with the balance becoming due at transfer of 
title. 
E. CONCLUSION AS TO ADMISSIBILITY. 
There is simply not space in this Brief to recount for this 
Court all of the evidence which was adduced in support of the 
position taken by the Plaintiff. This is the reason why the 
Appellate Courts of this State have consistently allowed broad 
discretion to the trial court in making determinations of relevancy 
and of admissibility under Rules 401, 402 and 403. The trial court 
was in a unique position to assess whether or not the documents, 
even if technically relevant, would add anything to this matter or 
would result in confusion, delay and wasted time. The trial court 
was in a unique position to be able to determine whether or not the 
documents would have any effect on the outcome, given the other 
overwhelming evidence presented at trial. Clearly, the trial court 
was correct and the exclusion of Exhibits 57 and 58 was not error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURTS TAXING 
OF COSTS WAS APPROPRIATE. 
During the course of the trial, Plaintiff called two non-party 
witnesses, Mr. Jim Vernes and Mr. Bruce McEntire. Both witnesses 
reside outside of the State of Utah. Their appearance was 
voluntary, at the request of the Plaintiff. Their testimony was 
clearly necessary in order to prove all of the elements of the 
case, including compensation and the amount thereof. 
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The Plaintiff admits that in its Memorandum of Costs the 
actual travel expenses of both witnesses are included for a total 
of $1,142.95. The Court allowed costs of $1,773.85. The Plaintiff 
therefore assumes that the Defendant has no quarrel with the 
remainder of the costs incurred, but objects only to the travel 
expenses of these two witnesses. Plaintiff also assumes that the 
Defendant would have no objection to the taxing of costs at twenty-
five cents per mile, one way, within the State of Utah, for each 
witness. 
The award of costs is governed by Rule 54(d)(1) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The issue of which costs are to be 
allowed is defined by the case law. 
This Court's recent decision in Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 
(Utah App. 1990) , is helpful. In Morgan, this Court noted that the 
award of costs is reviewed under a "abuse of discretion" standard. 
This Court also noted, in Morgan. that the rule on costs is not as 
strict as the Defendant would argue. The standard to be applied, 
in accordance with the ruling in Morgan, is as follows: 
Costs are generally allowable only in the amounts and in 
the manner provided by statute, but the [Utah] Supreme 
Court has taken the position that the trial court can 
exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance 
of costs; and that it has a duty to guard against any 
excesses or abuses in the taxing thereof. Id. at 686. 
The trial court has not abused its discretion in this regard. 
The testimony of Mr. Vernes and Mr. McEntire were entirely 
necessary to the proving of Plaintiff's case. Without their 
testimony, Plaintiff would have had less of a chance of prevailing. 
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The Defendant argues that the travel costs of the witnesses 
are eliminated by §21-5-4, Utah Code Annotated. However, to tax 
costs on the basis of twenty-five cents per mile for each mile 
traveled inside of the State is arbitrary, if not impossible. Each 
of these Defendants traveled from outside of the State of Utah. 
The exact route taken by Mr. McEntire is unknown. The route taken 
by Mr. Vernes was an airline route. The exact number of miles is 
also unknown. It is, therefore, impossible to compute the miles 
at twenty-five cents, one way only. To do so results in an 
improper and artificial calculation. 
Accordingly, this Court should allow the trial court's 
discretion in this matter and allow the actual expenses of travel 
incurred by these witnesses. This Court's ruling in Morgan give 
just such discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter was tried to a jury for approximately three days. 
The Defendant was given every opportunity to produce relevant 
evidence. On the issue of Exhibits 57 and 58, the trial court 
ruled that the documents themselves were irrelevant. However, the 
trial court did allow the Defendant to ask the witness, for 
impeachment purposes, whether his understanding of compensation was 
consistent with the language found in the Exhibits. (R. 1188.) 
The Defendant did not choose to follow the Court's ruling in that 
regard. Accordingly, the Defendant should not be allowed to 
complain, now, that he was prejudiced in some manner. 
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The judgment of the trial court is founded upon competent 
evidence and should be allowed to stand. 
DATED this / ^ ^ - day of October, r993 
IE R. SMITH 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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